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The military purpose of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) is to prevent or complicate access to specific areas by killing or incapacitating enemy ground troops.1 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of landmines used in the last 
several decades have been left in place following the end of 
conflict, posing a grave threat to local populations. Today, more 
than eighty million landmines remain active in over seventy 
countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the international com-
munity and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have rec-
ognized the humanitarian crisis posed by landmines.
The scale of the landmine crisis is alarming and has both 
direct and secondary impacts on affected communities. Since 
1975, it is estimated that over one million people have been 
killed or maimed by APLs, including hundreds of thousands of 
children.2 Landmine victims become a burden on their families 
because many can no longer work, and most require substantial 
medical care. In addition to the physical threat these weapons 
pose, their presence can have strong psychological effects and 
can hinder development and economic opportunities. More so 
than the mine itself, the threat of its presence is the underlying 
cause of the humanitarian crisis. Mines Advisory Group founder 
Rae McGrath states, “Any area suspected of being mined is a 
minefield until proven safe.”3 The possibility of landmines can 
prevent civilians from using farmland or traveling to another 
village, reducing productivity and preventing trade. Moreover, 
mine clearance is dangerous and costly, deterring investment 
from mine-affected communities and preventing development. 
These factors keep communities trapped in poverty and insecu-
rity, and prevent a return to normalcy for decades after a conflict 
ends.
In response to the alarming data regarding landmine casual-
ties in the early 1990s, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) declared an epidemic and began an advocacy 
campaign to limit the suffering caused by these remnants of 
war.4 Growing outrage, combined with media attention, led to 
an unprecedented coalition of NGOs, intergovernmental organi-
zations (IGOs), governments, and civilians calling for a global 
ban on anti-personnel landmines.5 In 1997, 124 states signed 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction, otherwise known as the Ottawa Convention.6 The 
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Sign in Golan Heights, Israel warns of mines.
treaty combined provisions for arms control with requirements 
for human protection under international humanitarian law 
(IHL). The Ottawa Convention is aimed at eliminating the use of 
landmines in order to protect civilians in accordance with human 
rights law and IHL.7 Additionally, the Convention contains 
requirements for mine clearance and victim assistance. The goal 
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) — a 
global coalition of NGOs that assisted the passage of the Ottawa 
Convention — and the Convention itself has been to eliminate 
the humanitarian landmine crisis, both through international 
cooperation in the humanitarian mine action8 effort and through 
the stigmatization of military landmine use.
As the concern over the landmine epidemic gained momen-
tum in the early 1990s, the United States was at the forefront of 
the initial call for the ban. President Bill Clinton actively par-
ticipated in the Ottawa Process9 leading up to the Convention, 
but ultimately refused to sign due to pressure from the Pentagon. 
Instead, President Clinton committed to developing alternative 
weapons, then banning landmine use, and signing the Ottawa 
Convention by 2006.10 However, following the administration 
change in 2000 and the start of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
U.S. policy regarding landmines shifted as the international 
military focus turned to terrorism. In 2004, President George 
W. Bush announced that the United States would not sign the 
Ottawa Convention and would continue to produce and stockpile 
landmines. This stance has left the United States behind most 
other states, which have continued to move toward a global ban 
on landmines.
This article examines the consequences of the U.S. refusal 
to sign the Ottawa Convention and examines the implications 
of its continued refusal for the Ottawa Convention and custom-
ary international law. The United States has historically been a 
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[T]o put an end to the suffering and casualties caused 
by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of 
people every week, mostly innocent and defenseless 
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic 
development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation 
of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have 
other severe consequences for years after emplacement, 
believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute 
in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the chal-
lenge of removing anti-personnel mines. . . . 14
While the Convention establishes specific timetables and 
guidelines for disarmament, the most important provisions are 
those that require states to clear all mines from their territories 
and ensure an ongoing commitment to assist victims and threat-
ened populations.15 Furthermore, reservations16 are not permit-
ted under any circumstances, preventing states from maintaining 
any existing minefields or stockpiles.
u.s. landmine PoliCy and its imPliCations
The U.S. government has defended its decision not to sign 
the Ottawa Convention based on a number of factors. First, the 
United States is, by a considerable margin, the world’s larg-
est financial donor to humanitarian mine action, contributing 
over $1.2 billion to activities in fifty countries since 1993. This 
funding supports mine clearance training and work, local mine 
risk education, victim assistance, mine-affected area surveys, 
and destruction of stockpiles. In many ways, these U.S. efforts 
surpass the requirements of the Ottawa Convention. Second, 
the United States has committed to using only detectable, non-
persistent landmines that will self-detonate or lose power after a 
short period of time.17 Although landmines have not been used 
in any U.S. conflict since the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. govern-
ment still views landmines as an indispensable military tool.18
Third, the U.S. government argues that the Ottawa Convention 
focuses too specifically on anti-personnel landmines while 
ignoring other unexploded ordnance (UXO).19 The United 
States maintains that the most effective method of controlling 
the UXO threat to civilians is the creation and implementation of 
responsible guidelines for their production, use, and subsequent 
global leader and advocate for human rights and humanitarian-
ism. In order to maintain this position, the United States must 
acknowledge the trend within the international community 
toward human security and protection and remain at, or at least 
near, the forefront of human rights law and IHL. Furthermore, 
continued U.S. refusal undermines the Ottawa Convention, 
which like other international law instruments, garners validity 
through consensus and mutual agreement. Without the support 
of the world’s dominant power, the Ottawa Convention cannot 
become customary international law; thus U.S. refusal provides 
leeway for rogue states to continue the use and production of 
persistent landmines.
ottaWa Convention
The Ottawa Convention is considered unique in that the 
global humanitarian community mobilized states in the effort 
to ban a weapon that was actively in use throughout the world. 
Eleven years after opening for ratification, the Convention has 
156 States Parties, and international trade in landmines has vir-
tually ceased.11 Civilian casualties are almost seventy percent 
below levels reported in the early 1990s.12 While several key 
states such as China, Russia, India, and the United States have 
not signed the Convention, very few states have used landmines 
in the last several years as a result of increasing stigmatiza-
tion. Non-signatories to the Convention are very reluctant to 
use mines because of the high political costs involved. In the 
past five years, the only governments to deploy landmines were 
Russia, Myanmar, and Nepal; all of whom used the mines within 
their own borders to fight insurgencies.13
In terms of international law, the Ottawa Convention has 
been noted for its role in successfully incorporating the con-
cepts of human security into the international legal framework. 
By using humanitarian advocacy and involving NGOs in the 
process, the Convention is the first treaty to eliminate a tool 
used for the protection of national security in favor of enhancing 
human security. The preamble to the Convention highlights this 
humanitarian focus in stating its purpose:
[T]he Ottawa Convention has been noted for its role 
in successfully incorporating the concepts of human 
security into the international legal framework. By using 
humanitarian advocacy and involving NGOs in the 
process, the Convention is the first treaty to eliminate  
a tool used for the protection of national security  
in favor of enhancing human security.
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removal. The Convention has been criticized for ignoring the 
dangers related to anti-tank mines, cluster munitions, and other 
UXOs.20 Fourth, the United States perceives the “mine-free” 
target of the Ottawa Convention to be an inefficient and mis-
guided goal. The intention of the comprehensive clearance goal 
is to increase the international focus on mine clearance, while 
ensuring that areas and villages are not overlooked. The United 
States supports a “mine-impact free” goal which will eliminate 
the threat of landmines in populated areas and transportation 
routes,21 the method which it argues allows for the most cost-
effective clearance of mine threats.
Finally, the U.S. government has refused to sign the Ottawa 
Convention because it does not allow for reservations. According 
to the United States, the unique situation in the demilitarized 
zone (DMZ) of the Korean peninsula requires the use of anti-
personnel landmines in order to deter North Korean forces from 
entering South Korea. Without landmines, a substantially higher 
number of troops and weaponry would be required in Korea and 
more lives would be at risk. As a result, the United States has 
determined that the military necessity of landmines outweighs 
the humanitarian benefits of a total ban on anti-personnel land-
mines.
Because the United States has been a strong advocate for 
universal human rights in the past and initiated the call for a 
landmine ban, it has been widely criticized for its refusal to 
accede to the Ottawa Convention. The government clearly needs 
to balance its competing expectations and requirements, but the 
landmine issue has become politically volatile. The ICRC argues 
that landmines are not an indispensable military weapon and 
that their value is dramatically outweighed by their post-conflict 
effects. The stigmatization of mine use has made their political 
costs prohibitive. As international law moves into the arena of 
human security, the United States cannot afford to sacrifice its 
position in international affairs and international law to defend a 
marginally useful military tool.
In order to examine the reasons behind U.S. landmine policy, 
it is important to contrast the prominent military and humanitar-
ian viewpoints on the issue. The military viewpoint stresses the 
value of anti-personnel landmines in conflict situations. They 
are considered “force multipliers” because they allow for the 
protection of larger areas with fewer troops. During military 
operations, active battlefields are viewed in terms of tactics 
and strategic objectives. Traditionally, marginal efforts aim to 
minimize “collateral damage” to civilians during wartime, while 
most concentrate on the main strategic objectives. The United 
States maintains that the responsible use of landmines in conflict 
situations is proportionately acceptable, in terms of military 
value, weighed against the potential danger to civilians.
The humanitarian viewpoint, on the other hand, focuses on 
the short- and long-term effects that landmines and other UXOs 
have on civilian populations. The ICRC conducted a study22 of 
the military effectiveness of landmine use and found that the 
weapons were generally used in violation of international law 
and that their use had minimal effects on the outcome of the 
conflicts.23 Because the responsible use of landmines requires 
substantial effort and organization, the ICRC concluded that 
armed forces are generally unable to follow IHL when marking 
and mapping landmines. Furthermore, because military opera-
tions focus on battlefield tactics, they often neglect to consider 
the post-conflict consequences when planting mines. In other 
words, battlefields often return to their use as crop fields, soc-
cer fields, or playgrounds when conflicts end. The humanitarian 
viewpoint acknowledges the numerous and considerable effects 
that landmine presence can have on post-conflict recovery and 
development.24
The presence of both viewpoints is evident in the complex 
and contradictory arguments found in U.S. landmine policy. The 
United States claims that, by remaining outside of the restric-
tions and requirements of the Ottawa Convention, it has more 
freedom to dedicate efforts toward the greatest humanitarian 
threats from all types of UXOs.25 However, this rationaliza-
tion fails to recognize the value of international solidarity and 
collective commitment. The primary purpose of the Ottawa 
Convention is to highlight the importance of human security 
under IHL by banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. 
The United States acknowledges the existence of humanitarian 
threats from UXOs, but has failed to recognize the importance 
of the Ottawa Convention in the legal process toward eliminating 
those threats. As illustrated by the recent Convention on Cluster 
Munitions,26 the international community intends to eliminate 
the humanitarian threat of persistent and indiscriminate weapons 
through the introduction of human security into international 
law. While both the United States and the international commu-
nity claim to be concerned with reaching the same goal, the U.S. 
has chosen to take a slow, incremental approach in opposition to 
the international majority.
As a result of 12 years of competing priorities and lack of 
determination, the United States is preventing the full eradica-
tion of the humanitarian landmine threat.27 Though it seems that 
the trend toward human security in international law will con-
tinue to move forward without the support of the United States, 
the refusal of such a dominant world power stands in the way of 
the Ottawa Convention becoming customary international law 
and significantly hampers the international protection of all vic-
tims from the threat of indiscriminate remnants of war.
u.s. PoliCy oPtions
The policy that the United States chooses to follow regard-
ing the Ottawa Convention has important implications, both for 
human security and post-conflict development in future conflict 
areas and for the framework of international law. Over the last 
15 years, U.S. landmine policy has reverted from a progressive 










Pile of landmines at the War Museum in Siem Reap, Cambodia.
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the United States could follow one of three possible courses of 
action regarding landmine policy: (1) continued adherence to the 
current policy; (2) movement toward the standards set out on the 
Ottawa Convention with an exception for the Korean peninsula; 
or (3) accession to the Ottawa Convention.
If it adheres to the current policy, the United States will 
continue to support humanitarian mine action on its own terms 
by identifying high-risk areas and considering the costs and 
benefits of removing landmines in remote areas. Continued 
support for mine clearance training, mine risk education, and 
victim assistance will continue to exceed the guidelines set out 
by the Ottawa Convention. The military will produce and stock-
pile non-persistent, detectable landmines and retain the right 
to deploy them in conflict. While it is highly unlikely that the 
United States would use landmines in future conflict due to the 
political consequences, the option will remain.
Following this policy will keep the United States at odds with 
the global humanitarian movement and the international com-
munity, and will prevent greater acceptance of human security 
and protection into international law. The Ottawa Convention 
will remain partially effective and, although landmines will 
become increasingly stigmatized, their use by rogue states and 
non-state actors will continue to inflict suffering and obstruct 
development.28 As the human security concept moves toward 
the elimination of additional indiscriminate weapons and tactics 
to prevent the suffering of innocent civilians, the United States 
will be seen as supporting inhumane warfare as the government 
continues to focus strictly on national security.
The second option would move U.S. policy in the direc-
tion of the Ottawa Convention mine ban, while maintaining an 
exception for the situation in the Korean DMZ. The goals of the 
Ottawa Convention would be strengthened to a small degree, 
as U.S. disapproval of landmine use will further stigmatize the 
weapon. Aside from Korea, it is unlikely that the United States 
would use landmines in future conflicts due to the growing stig-
matization. Therefore, producing and stockpiling these weapons 
serves only to comfort military officials. However, it is unlikely 
that additional countries would accede to the Convention, pre-
ferring instead to declare their own exceptions for continued use. 
Such a trend of exceptions would mean that the landmine ban 
would not be considered customary international law.
The third and most favorable option is a U.S. commitment 
to accede to the Ottawa Convention before the end of the cur-
rent presidential term in 2012. The military would be allowed 
the next three years to develop alternative technology, while 
maintaining access to current stockpiles in the meantime. The 
Convention requires States Parties to remove all landmines in 
the territories they control within ten years, allowing the United 
States until 2022 to replace landmines in the Korean DMZ with 
alternative weapons. By rejoining the rest of the progressive 
international community, the United States could renew its com-
mitment to human rights and IHL and cooperate in constructing 
future treaties focused on human security. With the United States 
as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention, the ban on landmine 
use would approach customary international law. With the full 
commitment of donor countries, the humanitarian threat of land-
mines would be significantly mitigated. Countries remaining 
outside of the Convention would come under increased pressure 
to accede, reducing the threat of landmine use to mostly non-
state actors. Because of the grave humanitarian threat posed by 
landmine use and UXOs, the United States must acknowledge 
that the civilian costs far outweigh their military value, and that 
international solidarity is the best path to their eradication.
ConClusion
While the purpose of the Ottawa Convention is clearly in line 
with the U.S. mission to support human rights and humanitar-
ian action around the world, perhaps the most important reason 
for accession to the Convention are the treaty’s implications 
for the future of international law. While the United States has 
supported the elimination of civilian landmine threats over the 
last twenty years, it has also continued to insist on the tactical 
military importance of indiscriminate anti-personnel landmines 
and has developed its policy based heavily on the military 
viewpoint. This insistence flies in the face of the international 
community’s acknowledgement of the disproportionate humani-
tarian effect of such weapons and the successful introduction of 
the human security concept into international law. Accession to 
the Convention is in the best long-term interest of the United 
States, allowing it to stay near the forefront of international 
law. Possessing the technology and capability to develop new 
weaponry, the United States must find an alternative to landmine 
use in Korea. The cost of ignoring the international consensus 
in order to maintain a fifty-year-old war zone is short-sighted 
and in opposition to U.S. goals to spread freedom and improve 












Three Republic of Korea soldiers patrolling the border at Panmunjeom 
in the DMZ between North and South Korea. 
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